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I. INTRODUCTION
GUATEMALA CITY - The United Nations issued a damn-
ing review of Guatemalan human rights.., painting a grim
panorama of state killings, death squads and abuses by left-
ist rebels ...
The report accused police and army forces of cold-blooded
murder, running "social cleansing" death squads to kill com-
mon thieves, drug trafficking, car thefts, and illegal log-
ging...
It said Guatemala's legal system was "virtually paralyzed,"
and incapable of investigating crimes, even threats and at-
tacks against its own judges and prosecutors.
The main victims of abuse continue to be human rights activ-
ists, politicians, and public prosecutors.!
The more I have thought about the implications of the ques-
tion whether prosecutors should be independent of the executive
in prosecuting abuses by the government, the more complicated
it seems. My own experience teaches me the importance of con-
text in addressing this question. Having helped establish the
Watergate Special Prosecution force to investigate President
Nixon's abuses, I began a major project in Guatemala with the
assumption that judges and prosecutors could force an end to
massive governmental abuses of every sort in that troubled
1. Fiona Neill, U.N. blasts Guatemala human rights, REUTERS, Oct. 31, 1995,
available in LEXIS, News Library, Wires File.
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country. I came to see that I was expecting far too much heroism
and ingenuity from ordinary human beings, that they could not
compensate for a lack of enthusiastic cooperation by the highest
political figures. Only the President and the Minister of Defense
could mobilize the police to provide the investigative resources
that were needed when there was a massacre, a political mur-
der, or a well-connected drug deal.
When abuses in Guatemala became particularly trouble-
some with the murder of ten or twelve students in the late sum-
mer of 1989, I went to the Minister of Defense and the President
and told them that Harvard Law School would leave Guatemala
unless they initiated a vigorous investigation of crimes for which
the country's security forces might well bear some responsibility.
Each told me that the failure was attributable to the investiga-
tive judges and prosecutors who were, they were at pains to
remind me, independent and responsible. For successful trials of
terrible abuses, Guatemala needed determined efforts by high-
level leaders to motivate the police to investigate and to protect
judges and prosecutors from violence - two essentials for a
successful prosecution. And, in the case of Guatemala, indepen-
dence provided an excuse for withholding those efforts.
I have studied prosecutors attempting to deal with govern-
mental abuse in a number of countries. The stories are very
interesting. An Israeli prosecutor, traditionally independent, is
fired for refusing to suppress a case against the domestic securi-
ty forces for killing two Palestinian terrorists after they were
arrested.' The Japanese Ministry of Justice, theoretically very
independent, declines to bring an obvious wiretapping case,
reminiscent of Watergate, against the official tappers of the
phone line of the Chairman of the Communist Party.3 The quite
independent prosecutors of South Africa decline to investigate
cases of police violence, including one involving a South African
officer who has personally killed dozens of demonstrators or sus-
pects.4 That the police are in charge of such investigations was
2. The incident involved here was the "Bus #300 Affair," in which Israeli se-
curity officers killed two Palestinian bus hijackers while they were in custody. For a
comprehensive discussion of this case, see Pnina Lahav, A Barrel Without Hoops:
The Impact of Counterterrorism on Israel's Legal Culture, 10 CARDOzO L. REv. 529
(1988).
3. See Setsuo Miyazawa, Scandal and Hard Reform: Implications of a Wiretap-
ping Case to the Control of Organizational Police Crimes in Japan, 23 KOBE U. L.
REV. 13 (1989).
4. The South African case is considered in Nico Steytler, Policing Political Op-
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the explanation I was given by the Attorney General in Cape
Town.
A British investigation of a "shoot-to-kill" policy affecting
IRA suspects in Northern Ireland and as far away as Gibraltar
is effectively hushed-up by the government without so much as a
peep from the prosecutors in a land we strongly associate with
the rule of law. Nor is it the prosecutors who reveal an apparent
fabrication of evidence against IRA suspects tried for bombings
in England.'
Obviously, more is involved than a structural arrangement
and a pledge of independence if the object is controlling govern-
mental abuses. For reasons of state, the government of France
humiliated its theoretically independent chief prosecutor by
having him urge on an unwilling court a trivial sentence for
Abdallah, the terrorist murderer of American and Israeli offi-
cials.6 Even the evidence presented by the French prosecutor
seemed purposely pared back to accomplish that result.7
The answer as to the desirability of an independent prosecu-
tor and what that means seems to me to require a quite compli-
cated analysis. If you will bear with me, I will try to be the
guide for a first exploratory excursion of this subject. My hope is
that, after this preliminary excursion, others will build on my
analysis to explore further its implications.
There are several major steps to the analysis, but initially it
ponents: Death Squads and Cop Culture, in TOWARDS JUSTICE? CRIME AND STATE
CONTROL IN SOUTH AFRICA (D. Hansson & D. van Zyl Smits eds., 1990).
5. See World in Action, In the Interests of Justice (Granada television
broadcast, Oct. 28, 1985) (transcript on file with author); see also World in Action, A
Surprise Witness (Granada television broadcast, Jan. 12, 1986) (transcript on file
with author). One of our triumphs in Guatemala was to bring the prosecutors and
investigative judges to the point where they would attack such an effort to fabricate
evidence.
For examinations of the British response to IRA activities, see William R.
Nelson, Terrorist Challenge to the Rule of Law: The British Experience, 13 TERROR-
ISM 227 (1990); R.J. SpJut, The 'Official" Use of Deadly Force by the Security Forces
Against Suspected Terrorists: Some Lessons from Northern Ireland, 1986 PUB. L. 38
(1986). (These articles do not discuss the role of prosecutors specifically, but rather
focus on the governmental response in general).
6. The Abdallah trial, particularly its implications for multilateral cooperation
in combating terrorism, is explored in Philip B. Heymann, International Cooperation
in Dealing with Terrorism: A Review of Law and Recent Practice, 6 AM. U. J. INT'L




is important to clarify an uncontroversial assumption that un-
derlies it. Like most of those discussing the subject of the rela-
tionship of the prosecutor to the highest governmental officials, I
will assume that because of professional tradition or public ex-
pectation, the prosecutor is more committed to equal and unbi-
ased enforcement of the law than is the president or the other
governmental powers such as, in Latin America, the minister of
defense. Otherwise, and "otherwise" was often the situation in
Guatemala, structures make no difference. The prosecutor will
simply behave as the highest political officials wish, without
regard for the structural and other guarantees of independence.
I will also assume that the law itself is, on its face if not in
application, fair, neutral, and respectful of human rights. Sub-
stantial pressures from other nations have often assured this
condition of formal correctness even in very repressive regimes.
With those assumptions stated, I begin my analysis.
In Part II, I categorize the types of governmental abuses
and discuss the sources of abuse, the motivation for each of the
sources of abuse, and the attitudes of high-level officials towards
them. In Part III, I analyze the power of the significant actors -
elected officials, police, and prosecutors - in relation to one
another. In Part IV, I discuss the relevance of independence for
the effectiveness of prosecutions, analyzing the ambiguities in
the notion of independence and the inherent complexity about
the areas of independence. In Part V, I explore these ideas as
applied to the most difficult cases - abuses by security forces in
the name of internal security. Finally, in Part VI, I look at the
steps prosecutors may be able to take that would increase the
power of democratically elected leaders to prevent abuses by the
military in the name of national security.
II. A CATEGORIZATION OF THE TYPES OF GOVERNMENTAL ABUSE
A. Sources of Governmental Abuse
Without great loss in generality, we can use a relatively
simple framework to classify abuses by their source and by their
motivation. As to source, there are at least four possibilities
which I shall illustrate with American examples.
First, abuses may be initiated by the highest government
officials, including the elected or unelected political leaders. In
the United States the cover-up of Watergate would be a clear
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example. Second, abuses can be carried out by lower level offi-
cials in the executive branch, without the direction of their polit-
ical superiors. The claimed independence of Oliver North and
John Poindexter in the Iran-Contra Affair would be an example
of the second.
Since the police are the primary investigators of crime and
the maintainers of public order, we should consider as a third
category, different from the second, abuses by the police. The
beating of Rodney King by Los Angeles Police Department offi-
cers is a now very familiar example. Fourth, and finally, there is
the extremely troublesome case of abuses directed by intelli-
gence or military forces and carried on relatively independently
of the elected political leadership. The break-ins to the houses of
the families of political radicals in the aftermath of the activities
of the Weathermen in the United States, break-ins ordered by
top officials of the FBI, would be a rare U.S. example of this.
B. Motivations for Governmental Abuse
The source of abuse furnishes only one axis on the matrix of
governmental abuse. The other axis is furnished by the motiva-
tion, for each of the sources of abuse may be acting out of any of
several motivations. Recognizing that any of several categoriza-
tions would be useful, I will propose a division into three types
of motivations.
First, the purpose of the governmental abuse may be per-
sonal enrichment through corruption or extortion. Corruption at
the highest level of government has posed serious problems for
Japan, Argentina, the United States, and many other countries.
The corruption of the military or intelligence forces, for personal
gain, is a serious problem in many countries in Latin America -
a problem made far worse by the United States policy of encour-
aging military involvement in drug suppression. Mexico and
Colombia are only two examples. I need hardly provide examples
of corruption or extortion at the working levels of the police or
the lower levels of other bureaucracy.
A second major motivation for governmental abuse, and one
that is particularly threatening to democracy, is the monitoring
and control of political opponents.8 Sometimes the monitoring
8. Intelligence investigations give rise to a serious dilemma for democratic so-
[Vol. 26:3
INDEPENDENT PROSECUTORS
itself is illegal; examples are Watergate and the wiretapping in
Japan. However, in many countries, including Great Britain and
France, some political intelligence-gathering on mainline politi-
cal opponents is believed to be an appropriate activity for the
police or intelligence agencies. In other countries, Germany is an
example, where gathering intelligence on radical parties of the
Left or Right is an authorized activity, the authorization has
been stretched to reach mainline opponents.
Of course it is not simply the intelligence gathering that
constitutes the serious abuse in many cases. Using the intelli-
gence, the government may order the torture, murder, or disap-
pearance of political opponents. That has been true in Argenti-
na, Chile, Uruguay, Guatemala, and many other Latin American
countries. In the United States the Nixon Administration pro-
posed to use such information to penalize its opponents by tax
audits or, in the case of Daniel Ellsberg, by making public his
most personal secrets (which the Administration hoped to find
by breaking into the office of Ellsberg's psychiatrist).
When political repression is carried out at a street level, at
the direction of a local police commander or even of lower-level
officers, we have order maintained through the repression of
legal activities that are disapproved by the police. I would in-
clude racist forms of law enforcement in this category, although
they are of course worse for being based on race. They are an
effort to maintain a form of dominance on the street and are
thus a low-level abuse motivated by political repression.
Neutrality in the ever-present contest between lawyers and
police requires me to note that prosecutors, too, can be the initi-
ators or agents of repression and violence, if they knowingly use
false evidence to obtain convictions, either for their own purpos-
es or at the direction of political superiors. Bringing false or
weak charges against the political leader's enemies was an
abuse perfected by Stalin and his chief prosecutor, Vyshinsky,
cieties, even if those investigations are conducted through legal channels. On the one
hand, monitoring may be a necessary tool for combatting domestic violence or terror-
ism. Yet, on the other hand, since people who advocate political views in line with
terrorists and in opposition to the government are the ones most likely to join or
aid terrorists, intelligence agencies will seek surveillance of those political groups,
thereby threatening democratic values by discouraging dissent. See PHILIP B.
HEYMANN, INTELLIGENCE GATHERING AND PROCESSING (1992) (unpublished manuscript
on fie with author).
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and then associated more broadly with the former Soviet Union
and its satellites.
Finally, I would use a catch-all category of abuse of power
where the motivation is neither economic self-interest nor politi-
cal repression, but simply pleasure in the exploitation of the
powers of an office or excessive enthusiasm for one's role. An
army that kills its guerrilla opponents even when it would be
wiser (not simply more moral) to take them prisoner, a police
force that freely provides beatings without trial, an intelligence
agency that exploits its access to private information - these
are the more dramatic examples I have in mind. But the same
category would cover Kafkaesque abuses of bureaucratic power.
C. Attitudes Of High-Level Officials
As if four sources of abuse and three motivations for each
did not create a complicated-enough matrix of twelve boxes, I
should add one more variable in terms of types of abuse. As to
any abuse, except the obvious case where it is directed by the
highest-level government officials, it is important to know the
attitude of those highest political officials. There are several
possibilities. The form of governmental abuse may be opposed by
the highest political levels, in which case it survives only when
it is undiscovered. The abuse may be tolerated by the political
leaders or simply ignored, as when the political power of those
engaged in the abuse or - in Latin America - their military
power makes opposition unwise or dangerous. In extreme cases,
the governmental abuse may be protected and covered up at the
highest political levels. Prime Minister Shamir protected the
killing of two Palestinian terrorists by Shin Bet in the Bus #300
Affair.' Margaret Thatcher protected the killing of IRA terror-
ists.'" On assuming office Ronald Reagan promptly pardoned
Felt and Miller, the FBI executives who had ordered illegal
break-ins to pursue the Weathermen."
9. Lahav, supra note 2.
10. For an account of the killings in Gibraltar, see Ian Jack, Gibraltar, 25
GRANTA 15 (1988).
11. Francis J. Martin, Leveling, N.Y. TIMES, May 11, 1981, at A19. In 1972 and
1973, Mark and Miller, F.B.I. officials, authorized secret searches of homes of indi-




This final distinction is important. If the highest political
levels are protecting a form of governmental abuse or, worse, are
directing it, any control they can exercise over the prosecutor
will be used to prevent successful prosecution of that wrongdo-
ing. If, at the opposite extreme, the highest political levels are
opposed to the form of abuse, but simply are unable to discover
and control it, they will be a source of support to the prosecutor,
particularly if they are his superiors and can claim credit for his
activities. The most interesting category is the middle one,
where the highest political officials are tolerating or ignoring
abuses because of the political or military power of those respon-
sible. That situation, so characteristic of military-civilian rela-
tions in recent decades in Latin America, will require our fur-
ther attention, but not yet.
III. THE POWERS OF THE MAJOR ACTORS (ELECTED OFFICIALS,
POLICE, AND PROSECUTORS) Vis-A-Vis EACH OTHER
Since we are assuming that our purpose is to strengthen the
rule of law and respect for human rights, and since we are as-
suming that the prosecutor is more committed to these values
than the police, the highest political figures, or the security
forces, what we want is to grant the maximum freedom, resourc-
es and influence to the prosecutor. My description of our objec-
tives is contentious. There are values other than the rule of law
and respect for the political and civil rights of individuals. But
if, for simplicity, you will accept my statements of our tentative
objective - at least for countries where legality and human
rights have not been widely respected - then the fact that we
want to grant maximum power to the prosecutor follows from
his greater interest in the objectives.
What does not follow is that the greatest power comes from
the greatest independence. We would not think that necessarily
true of a foreign minister who we know needs the help of the
president in dealing with military and intelligence officials as
well as domestic organizations. It is not necessarily true of an
attorney general. It is of course true that being subject to the
direction of political figures less committed to the rule of law
and human rights results in their power to deflect him from
pursuing his, and by hypothesis our, objectives. But being sub-
ject to some control by the highest political figures may also pro-
vide powers that the prosecutor needs.
1995]
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Let me be precise. Preventing governmental abuses may
require the cooperation, at the prosecutor's request, of any or all
of the following groups which are independent of him: police,
courts, and the authorized managers of government agencies.
The first is obvious. To find the facts, the prosecutor is likely to
need the cooperation of the police. In many countries the formal
arrangement puts the prosecutor in charge of the investigation
and directs the police to follow his directions; but rarely if ever
is this scrupulously or even generally followed in practice. 2 The
relationship between the prosecutor and the police, whose sup-
port he badly needs, is always problematic.
The prosecutor needs the support and trust of the court that
will adjudicate any cases he brings. Countries vary in this area.
The support of the judiciary is so clear in Japan and China and
was so clear in the Soviet Union that many western nations
questioned whether the system is one of administrative determi-
nation by the prosecutor rather than adjudication by a court. At
the opposite extreme, the skepticism of judges in many Latin
American countries about evidence produced by the police makes
conviction on such evidence very difficult. The same is true in
the Bronx in New York City.
The prosecutor may need the cooperation of the highest
government officials if he is to get the cooperation of lower-level
officials in furnishing information and evidence about govern-
mental wrongdoing and if he is to get the cooperation of the
police in investigating such cases. The prosecutor may also need
the cooperation of the highest government officials in establish-
ing systems and mechanisms to reduce the possibility of govern-
mental abuse in the future: review boards for police brutality or
procurators or inspectors general to detect corruption.
To handle governmental abuse the prosecutor must put
together an effective cooperating team out of this group of inde-
pendent actors. To enlist their support he has at his disposal
more or less of a few powers. Let me review them. He can call
upon the courts to adjudicate guilt or innocence if he has the
necessary evidence and independence of contrary orders by supe-
riors. He can call upon the police to gather the needed evidence
relying on their subordination to the highest political or military
12. See Thomas Weigend, Criminal Procedure: Comparative Aspects, in ENCY-
CLOPEDIA OF CRIME AND JUSTICE (S. Kadish ed., 1983).
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officials, if the highest political or military officials are willing to
assist the prosecutor. He can call on the police on his own if the
police have developed a tradition of independence and want
convictions (rather than summary punishment of offenders or
impunity), but only if the police also see the work of the prose-
cutor as helpful in convincing the court to convict. That helpful-
ness may take the form either of advising what evidence is nec-
essary on what elements of the crime or of obtaining the court's
approval for certain investigative steps like a search arrest or
wiretap.
If the political leaders are recalcitrant and the police unco-
operative, the prosecutor can call on the public to use its politi-
cal pressure to support the prosecutor.13 Whether the public
will respond to the call depends upon the role it assigns to the
prosecutor, the police, and (to a lesser extent) the courts in deal-
ing with two crucial issues: the danger of violence by private
groups and the danger of lawlessness by government officials.
How the public responds, which is often a crucial variable in
terms of the power of the prosecutor, also depends upon the
relative importance influential segments of the public attach to
order and safety on the streets, on the one hand, and govern-
mental abuses, on the other. If the danger of street violence is
very great, the prosecutor may not be able to generate public
support in demanding police cooperation or increased police
lawfulness; the public is likely to support the police instead. If
concern about government illegalities is great, the prosecutor
may not be able to generate public support in any conflict over
13. An independent media can greatly enhance the prosecutor's ability to draw
on the power of the public to pressure high government officials, the courts, or the
police to aid the prosecutor. On this topic, consider David M. Kennedy, Exposing
Police Terrorism in Spain, in PHILIP B. HEYMANN & ROBERT KLITGAARD, DEALING
WITH CORRUPTION AND INTIMIDATION IN CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEMS: CASES AND MA-
TERIALS (1991). As Kennedy notes, 'The Spanish public, spurred onward by a scoop
in the Spanish press, wanted to know much more. Late in August, reporters for the
newsweekly Diario 16 had received a tip and discovered a GAL cache in the south
of France . . ." David M. Kennedy, Exposing Police Terrorism in Spain, [CASE PRO-
GRAM, JOHN F. KENNEDY SCHOOL OF GOVERNMENT, HARVARD UNIVERSITY, 1990, CASE
No. C16-90-956.0].
The media can play a role by either investigating government abuses on its
own, or by urging the public to demand an official investigation. The key to keeping
a system from being "user-friendly" is to preserve avenues which would reveal - or
insist on the revelation of - information the government may not want published.
An independent media is one such avenue.
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his authority vis-A-vis that of the courts.
Finally, the power of the prosecutor to invoke public support
in order to control the other agencies necessary to eliminate
government abuse depends upon the reputation of the
prosecutor's office. If the prosecutor is thought to be a forceful
representative of personal security and order and a strong oppo-
nent of street crime, he need worry less about quarreling with
the police even in a situation of substantial public apprehension
about law and order. The same is true, of course, if the police
are thought to be totally ineffective in providing safety. If the
prosecutor is thought to be wholly committed to law and human
rights, he need worry less about the complaints of judges.
Most important, perhaps, if the prosecutor is thought to be
much more committed to enforcing lawfulness among govern-
ment officials than the highest political officials, he will enjoy a
substantial political advantage in mobilizing those who are very
concerned about this issue. They in turn may be influential with
an elected political figure and yet themselves have very little
influence on the leaders of the military.
The result of all this is to create a complicated set of forces,
the strength of which depends upon public attitudes and organi-
zational reputations and capacities. This set of forces determines
the relative powers of the prosecutor, the police, the judiciary,
the highest elected officials and the security forces. The extent of
these relative powers determines the capacity of the prosecutor
to generate the cooperation he needs to deal with government
abuses. And what cooperation he needs depends upon what
governmental abuses we are talking about, as does what cooper-
ation he will get from others.
I apologize for the complexity of the picture, but that's the
way it is. Perhaps this complexity helps explain why it is so
difficult to say that independence helps or harms a prosecutor in
dealing with the whole array of forms and contexts of govern-
mental abuse.
IV. THE RELEVANCE OF INDEPENDENCE FOR THE PROSECUTOR'S
EFFECTIVENESS
There is more ambiguity in the notion of an independent
prosecutor than at first appears. Prosecutors in Germany, the
United States, and Japan are formally subordinate to justice
[Vol. 26:3
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ministries, but tradition guaranties them substantial indepen-
dence. It was a scandal for Prime Minister Shamir to remove the
Attorney General of Israel. Firing the specially-appointed Water-
gate prosecutor, Archibald Cox, led very directly to President
Nixon's near-impeachment and resignation. There is also com-
plexity about the areas of independence. The highest political
figures may be authorized by tradition as well as delegation to
make prosecutorial policy at a general level and forbidden to
interfere in individual decisions.14
So what we are talking about is a continuum between very
substantial independence and very substantial dependence on
the orders of political superiors who are not entrusted with
prosecutorial responsibilities. Few prosecutors' offices have the
independence of the United States' "Independent Counsel" in
setting their own budgets. Few prosecutors' offices are subject to
direct orders to bring or drop a case. Most prosecutors fall some-
where between these extremes. The question is, what is to be
said for a closer or more remote relationship between the prose-
cutor and the highest political figures in a country? I think the
answer is contextual; it is different in different situations.
A. Abuses Committed or Protected by the Highest Political
Figures
This is the case that comes most readily to mind and as to
which the answer seems straightforward. To whatever extent
the prosecutor can be given orders by the very officials whose
corruption or acts of political repression should be stopped, the
prosecutor will be disabled from bringing those leaders into
court even where the force of public opinion is strongest in its
demands for equal treatment of the powerful with the most ordi-
nary citizen.
For that reason the United States has a statute appointing
an independent prosecutor in any such cases. 5 Japan has an
even older tradition that involves a similar procedure for similar
14. In a way that is not relevant to our discussion, prosecutorial independence
may also be affected by various schemes of judicial or public review of a decision
not to prosecute. That is true in Germany and Japan, for example.
15. Ethics in Government Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-521, 92 Stat. 1820 (cod-




B. Abuses Committed by Other Governmental Officials
If we turn from the highest political figures to the other
possible sources of government abuse, several questions become
crucial:
* How important to prevention of the abuse are steps
that only the highest political figures can take?
* What is their attitude toward the particular combina-
tion of the source of the abuse and the type of abuse
(for example, brutality by police or corruption by mid-
dle-level department officials)?
* What is their freedom to act with regard to those sourc-
es and types of abuse?
* Are the highest political figures more likely to act in
support of a prosecutor who is known as their agent or
in support of a prosecutor who is known to be indepen-
dent?
The last question demands special attention. Depending on
the costs and risks, political figures will support a prosecutor if
they see that to be in their interests. To be precise, they will do
more than they otherwise might do because of the requests or
actions of the prosecutor only if they see that to be a route to
greater domestic or international support for them and their
goals by the public or influential organizations or nations.
If the prosecutor's position is a highly respected one and the
occupant shares in that respect, political figures may be brought
to support the prosecutor simply because of the losses in politi-
cal or international support that would come from his publiciz-
ing their lack of cooperation. The clearest and most extreme
example of this was the ability of Archibald Cox, as the first
Watergate Special Prosecutor, to bring the very powerful Presi-
dent of the United States to deliver incriminating documents
and tapes to the courts.
16. See Miyazawa, supra note 3.
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If, on the other hand, the prosecutor's position is not greatly
respected or if there is widespread cynicism about the neutrality
of application of the criminal law, political figures are not likely
to fear the consequences of failing to cooperate or of refusing to
order other members of the executive branch to cooperate with
an investigation. In that situation the greatest effectiveness of
the prosecutor may lie, as in the case of other executive branch
officials, in his ability to persuade the highest elected officials of
what is in their interest. A prosecutor known to be loyal to the
president or prime minister is likely to be more persuasive than
one thought to be entirely independent.
Consider an opposite extreme from corruption or abuse by
the president, the prime minister, or closely associated col-
leagues. The police in many countries are corrupt and brutal for
their own purposes, not exclusively or largely for the purposes of
the administration. A prosecutor cannot successfully investigate
this or take steps that will bring it to a stop without the cooper-
ation of friendly or at least supportive police commanders. The
Serpico scandal in New York would not have ended in substan-
tial reforms without the appointment of a new, reforming police
chief, Patrick Murphy. Reforms in Los Angeles after the beating
of Rodney King depended on finding a police chief more support-
ive of reform than Darrell Gates.
If the chief political figure is embarrassed by police abuse of
governmental power and if he could be persuaded to take strong
steps, I would rather see the arguments and the proposals for
reform made by a prosecutor closely tied to the executive branch
than by an independent prosecutor. Only in the former case will
the arguments have the force of coming from a loyal supporter
and an informed insider. Only in the former case will the rec-
ommendations be fully informed and will there be the potential
of police cooperation with the prosecutor in carrying them out.
Only in the former case will remedial action redound to the
credit of the administration and not look like the response of
those who were caught failing in their duties of supervision. All
or much of the same could be said of crimes of corruption carried




V. THE HARDEST CASE: ABUSE IN THE NAME OF SECURITY BY
SECURITY FORCES
The hardest question arises with regard to the most fright-
ening form of governmental abuse in Latin America - abuse
sponsored or supported by leaders of the military against a polit-
ical element they consider dangerous even when it is not in-
volved in armed resistance. Many months after the conversa-
tions I had with the Minister of Defense and President of Gua-
temala in 1989, most people thought that the situation was not
greatly changed. In early 1992 a professor of history at
Guatemala's major university was shot dead in front of his
home. He had been working on the organization of internally
displaced people. The leaders of human rights organizations and
trade unions still receive serious death threats. The student
organization, the murder of whose leaders had led us to confron-
tation and our departure, was bombed in the same early days of
1992. In late October 1995, the United Nations reported wide-
spread human rights abuses and a paralyzed justice process in
Guatemala.
There is never proof of who is responsible for such events;
there never has been in Guatemala or in many other countries,
although in Argentina they stopped abruptly with the coming of
civilian government. The Attorney General of Guatemala may
investigate publicly, but still no cases may be brought. This is
surely the hardest category to deal with as well as the most
important form of governmental abuse, both because of the hor-
ror of its consequences and because of its impact on democracy.
A. The Many Reasons for Pessimism
As to this crucial category of governmental abuse, the cen-
tral question is not about the independence of the prosecutors or
even the courts. It is simply why should anyone think that inde-
pendent prosecutors or courts could help deal with abuses in the
name of internal security carried out by a quite independent
military? If the highest political authorities had the power to
control the security forces, they would do it if they wanted to. If
leaders enjoying popular legitimacy lack either the power or the




The reasons the highest political authorities in Latin Ameri-
ca often lack the power to control the security forces are clear
enough. Middle and lower military ranks will not follow the
direction of political authorities when they conflict with military
orders, at least with regard to matters that are very broadly
considered matters of internal security. Civilian supremacy is
not established among security forces. The tradition is other-
wise; the training is otherwise; political authorities are often
regarded as corrupt or naive; and the risks of disobedience to
military superiors are far greater than the risks of disobeying
elected leaders. All this is different in western democracies
What is more, the risks to the political authorities of mount-
ing a broad based political challenge to this are extremely se-
rious. There could be a coup, supported in Latin America (as it
would not be in Western nations and was not in France at the
time of the Algerian solution) by powerful and politically influ-
ential economic forces. Democracy is held in too little repute and
coups are too frequent to count on a popular uprising against
them in many countries. And even if a coup is out of the ques-
tion - because coups have become politically reprehensible in
international society with the wave of democracy - selective
assassination remains a powerfully inhibiting threat. Compared
to those risks, allowing the military to control substantial but
bounded areas of the nation's policy seems a small price for
elected political leaders to pay in terms of insurance.
Faced with such a confrontation of extremely powerful polit-
ical and military forces - the one supported by an elected man-
date and an ideology of democracy, the other by a loyal army
and an ideology of national security - what can be expected of
the relatively weak claimants to an ideology of law, the courts
and independent prosecutors? Exclusive military jurisdiction
over adjudication of alleged military abuses is jealously guarded
in many Latin American countries, although often civilian prose-
cutors may at least initiate cases in military courts. The police
are generally under the control of the military, and without
police support the resources for investigation of murders when
bodies are found in remote areas is slight. The police will also
not cooperate in protecting prosecutors, judges and witnesses
from the risks associated with investigating crimes by security
forces. Even if the police were willing to cooperate and to pro-
tect, evidence of crimes committed on military bases or evidence
that could only be obtained there would be inaccessible.
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To all these reasons to doubt the efficacy of independent
judges and prosecutors in situations where the highest elected
officials find themselves unable or unwilling to prevent govern-
ment abuse by military forces, one more reason for doubt should
be added. Nowhere is the legitimate domain of law more vigor-
ously contested even in the most lawful of western countries
than where its boundaries confront claims of national security or
internal security. It was in this area that the Prime Minister of
Israel refused to allow the trial of apparent murders by the
intelligence forces,17 where the Prime Minister of England took
active measures to prevent the exploration of responsibility for
the killings of IRA agents, 8 where the French tampered with
the trial of a murdering terrorist, 9 and where the Japanese
prevented the trial of officials for illegal wiretapping."
I could extend the examples to the United States and many
other countries. This point is straightforward, however, without
more examples. No one knows the precise boundaries between
the ideology of national security and the ideology of law in most
countries, although the boundary is surely located far more
favorably to the rule of law in the United States than in, for
example, Guatemala. Each of these ideologies claims passionate-
ly jurisdictions that are as vigorously claimed by the other. For
our purposes what is important is that the contested areas are
the least secure domain for those insisting on the rule of law.
President Carter acted on behalf of law to try high FBI officials,
Miller and Mark, for illegal break-ins to the homes of family
members of Weathermen.2' Reagan immediately returned the
territory - hard-won by a successful conviction - to the hands
of those responsible for internal security by pardoning the FBI
officials.2
17. See Lahav, supra note 2.
18. See Jack, supra note 10.
19. See Heymann, supra note 6.
20. See Miyazawa, supra note 3.




B. The Grounds for Hope
An elected president, who finds himself pushed by the mili-
tary or some elements of the military to tolerate forms of brutal
political repression that he personally despises, may find his
bargaining position strengthened by pressure from the other
side. Look for a moment at why death squads are chosen. A
government could go about repression, as the Soviet Union or
East Germany did, using law as its tool. The system is simple
enough. You create new political crimes and crimes of associa-
tion. You censor and punish for unauthorized speech. You
strengthen your capacity to enforce these laws by weakening
familiar judicial protections: the burden of proof, access to coun-
sel, guarantees of privacy, rights not to be tortured, freedom
from surveillance by a mass of paid or terrified informants, the
right to confront hostile witnesses and evidence. Judges may be
subjected to pressure by the political leadership, perhaps using
prosecutors for this purpose. The Nazis did this. Alternatively,
military courts or special secret courts can replace regular and
open trials. If all these options remain too cumbersome, intern-
ment without trial is still available wherever the British colonial
tradition survives.
But instead of using these forms of legality, with their ac-
companying publicity, Latin American governments have relied
on death squads for repression and they have done this despite a
set of special risks that come with this secret use of violent re-
pression. The likelihood of making mistakes increases rapidly;
the Mossad brought to an end its assassination of Black Septem-
ber assassins when it killed by mistake a Norwegian waiter."
Those who operate the secret system tend over time to turn it to
their own personal purposes, seeking money, power, or sex. That
was true in Guatemala and in Argentina. And the absence of the
notice that even repressive laws give, and of the opportunity to
remain safe by obeying such laws, increases fear and resentment
even in those who might support the repressive regime.
The primary reason for bearing such costs is that those who
are operating the system want deniability at home and abroad.
23. See Appendix I: Court Judgment Published After the Trial of the Israeli
Secret Service Agents Accused of Complicity in Wael Zuaiter's Assassination, in FOR A
PALESTINIAN: A MEMORIAL TO WAEL ZUAITER (Janet Venn-Brown ed., 1984).
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Deniability requires effective control of any authoritative fact-
finding system, such as the criminal justice system. In the words
of a scholar of the South African death squads, deniability re-
quires a "user-friendly" criminal justice system.24 The form of
government abuses we are looking at is not simply a death
squad, it is a secret death squad. Very few countries operate
open death squads. The cost is too high in terms of international
opprobrium and domestic disdain.
In this context, the "deal" between elected leaders and the
military in a country tolerant of brutality by the military against
dissident leaders and organizations generally assumes that
there will be no scandal caused by open revelation of what has
been done. The president agrees to do nothing, perhaps because
his hands are tied, but only so long as it is politically and inter-
nationally tolerable to do nothing; and that is only so long as
there is a substantial measure of ambiguity as to who is respon-
sible for any killings, disappearances, or torture. The military
must deliver unaccountability as part of the bargain under
which the president delivers silence or excuses rather than
pointed denunciations and personal support of organized opposi-
tion to the repressive role of the military.
VI. WHAT A PROSECUTOR CAN Do ABOUT MILITARY ABUSES
In the final analysis the crucial questions about indepen-
dent prosecutors, like those about independent investigative or
trial judges are these. What could a prosecutor do that would
strengthen the hand of democratically-elected leaders in pre-
venting abuses by a powerful military in the name of internal
security; and what resources would the prosecutor's office need
to provide that support? I do not think the prosecutor can act
alone. Even in Israel the prosecutor who insisted on investigat-
ing killings of terrorists by the intelligence forces was fired with-
out bringing about fundamental changes. 5 The same was true
in Spain where a prosecutor, together with the investigating
judge, insisted on pursuing killings of. ETA terrorists by a spe-
cial police unit.2" The results have been the same with an occa-
sional brave investigating judge in Guatemala.
24. See Steytler, supra note 4.
25. See Lahav, supra note 2.
26. See Kennedy, supra note 13.
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Some answers are indirect. To the extent that prosecutors
can strengthen the capacity of law enforcement to bring cases
for violation of laws - by improving the performance and credi-
bility of the police in the eyes of courts and the courts in the
eyes of the police - they reduce the justification for secret death
squad activity. The Minister of Defense of Guatemala responded
to my question about illegal assassinations by describing the
hopelessness of trials in Guatemala; colonels in the countryside
said the same thing when asked why they took no prisoners.
To the extent that prosecutors can make high-level corrup-
tion more costly and can make more credible claims that corrup-
tion is not without risk, they will help to build the popular sup-
port that the president needs in dealing with a powerful mili-
tary. After the first coup attempt of President Cerezo's tenure in
Guatemala, no crowds had appeared in support of democracy as
they later did in the streets of Moscow. Rumors and allegations
of massive corruption were a major reason for this dangerous
show of democratic weakness. Credibly establishing the indepen-
dence of a strong prosecutor in handling corruption allegations
would have served President Cerezo well in terms of his power
vis-h-vis the military.
But what of more direct attacks on repressive violence? As
we have seen, what is necessary is simply that the truth be
brought out in an authoritative way for, in many circumstances,
neither the elected officials nor military leaders will choose
death squads whose activities are made public. Secrecy has been
crucial to the maintenance of trade and aid relationships and to
a general level of acceptance in the world community - matters
which are frequently more important than the rather limited
benefits of buying insurance in the currency of violent repres-
sion.
The military has several ways to prevent an investigation
that would make the deal with political authorities intolerable.
It can control the police by demanding the appointment
of military men as the police leaders, by establishing an
understanding and a custom that certain cases will not
be investigated, and by using threats or violence to
discipline police who may mistake their primary respon-
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sibility, thinking it is to law enforcement. 7
Instead of controlling the investigators they can control
the evidence - destroying or denying access to it and
intimidating or killing witnesses.
They can limit the jurisdiction of independent, civilian
courts in cases against active duty officers or use less
formal means, intimidating or corrupting prosecutors or
judges or other fact-finders.
Each of these was familiar in Guatemala. Each is familiar
elsewhere in Latin America, Africa, and Asia. The question is: in
light of these military powers to block investigations, how can a
prosecutor or investigative judge help break the chain on which
impunity for military abuses depends? How can they defeat the
secrecy which provides unaccountability to domestic and inter-
national audiences? Indeed, this unaccountability is a crucial
condition of elected officials tolerating military abuses. If a pros-
ecutor or investigative judge could help elected officials "trump"
the three military devices for maintaining a user-friendly crimi-
nal justice system, she could help prevent the most dangerous
form of governmental abuse. But how? The answer is by careful-
ly building institutional and public support for honest and fear-
less investigations and prosecutions.
Picture a prosecutor's office that is widely respected both for
the role it plays in dealing with ordinary crime and for its com-
mitment to fair application of decent laws. Assume that the
prosecutor's office has learned to work closely with police inves-
tigators and has won their trust, creating at the same time a
shared commitment to enforcing the law. That would bring an
enviable reputation to the police as well. Imagine that the rela-
tionship of the prosecutor's office is close enough to the highest
elected officials that they can win domestic and international
support by defending its independence and yet provide it with
political support and resources. With these characteristics, what
could a prosecutor's office do to deal with the hardest form of
governmental abuse?
We have seen that the first military guarantee of a "user
27. The military may also have to use threats or violence to discipline members
of the press who seek to investigate governmental abuse.
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friendly" criminal justice system is control of the police. Defeat-
ing "user friendliness," on the other hand, requires the prosecu-
tor to provide leadership to the police. She needs their support.
Credibility in placing responsibility for deaths or disappearances
requires information, and information requires independent
investigators with whom it is safe to cooperate and whom it is
risky for others to obstruct or even to ignore. Those investigators
in turn must feel safe. These conditions, and the fact that re-
pressive violence may take place in any corner of the country at
any time, all suggest that the independent investigators cannot
be a small handful of people assigned to the prosecutor's office.
Nor does it suffice merely to place the entire police investigative
force formally under the jurisdiction of the prosecutor; the lead-
ership that appoints, promotes, transfers, and assigns must be
behind the investigation, not blocking it.
These are well-known relationships. Military leaders de-
manded the removal of the Minister of Government in Guatema-
la for the crime of obtaining outside financing that was building
the independence of the police. Similarly, I caused immense fear
of a military response by recommending that the prosecutor's
office be given a handful of investigators to handle investiga-
tions of serious government abuse including, prominently, by the
military. The reluctance of the military in many countries to see
a truly civilian chief of police is further evidence of the centrality
of this issue.
How can a prosecutor build support in the police? Not quick-
ly is one answer. He must be effective enough in cooperating
with the police in fighting ordinary crime and generous enough
in spreading the credit that the police will feel torn between
loyalty to honest investigations and responsiveness to military
superiors. He must be popular enough domestically or enough of
an international symbol to remain relatively safe from threats
and attacks, and he must be able to spread that net of safety
over those working for him on important cases. He must speak
up with the elected officials for police needs for resources and
openly condemn police abuses. He must encourage police rela-
tionships with the best of police elsewhere and police training by
the best of foreign departments.
What about the second capacity of the military: to deny
access to information or to obstruct investigations of otherwise
accessible information? The prosecutor must be clever enough to
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generate outside demands for steps that the president would
otherwise be reluctant to take. Relations with the media are
central here. He must be honorable enough so that his conclu-
sions provide public credibility to his resolution of questions
either about the responsibility for violence or about the responsi-
bility for failure to solve violent crimes. (If so, he can himself
generate outside demands for effective investigative steps, hon-
estly performed.) He must be political enough to build a domes-
tic and international constituency that the president must re-
spect and can tell the military he must respect - thereby lend-
ing presidential prestige to independent investigations.
And what of the final recourse of a military determined to
block investigations? In Guatemala, the Chief of the National
Police gathered evidence that the Chief of the separate Treasury
Police and a number of his agents were engaged in death squad
activity. He brought the evidence to an investigating judge,
Judge Trejo. Judge Trejo was kidnapped and, the same day, one
of his close associates was murdered. When he was released,
Judge Trejo promptly dismissed the charges against all the
Treasury Police. Similar stories are told of Chile under Pinochet,
and elsewhere.
Is this a hopeless final obstacle to serious investigations of
repressive violence? No, not if the prosecutor and police choose
from among the sets of steps that the Italians learned in dealing
with the Red Brigades, the French learned in dealing with Leba-
nese and domestic terrorists, and the Colombians learned in
dealing with Pablo Escobar and the Medellin Cartel. There are
steps, such as spreading r~sponsibility for dangerous investiga-
tions to make intimidation difficult,28 and they must be taken.
The same is true of corruption in the judicial system. Dealing
with repressive abuses by the military will require a program to
deal with corruption among police, prosecutors and judges, too.
Indeed, corruption and intimidation joined together, as drug
dealers have learned to use them in Mexico and Colombia, is the
most potent "medicine" for police, prosecutors, or judges straying
toward honesty. But even this combination can be combatted.
28. See, e.g., LEONARD B. WEINBERG & WILLIAM L. EUBANK, THE RISE AND




In the final analysis an upright and courageous prosecutor
can make a difference in dealing with governmental abuses.
Even in areas where the police fear to tread, the press or legisla-
tors may provide the investigative support that is necessary.
That happened in the case of the Spanish GAL and its assassi-
nations of ETA members. It was true in the United States of the
first stages of Watergate and of the Iran-Contra Affair.
Still, it is a mistake to think that uprightness and courage
alone are enough. Nor is independence the only missing ingredi-
ent. Independent prosecutors without appropriate powers can be
a dumping ground to provide political cover to leaders. Investi-
gative help of the sort that only the police can furnish is neces-
sary in many cases. The cooperation of others in the government
is often necessary. Evidence must be accessible and preserved;
witnesses cannot be too frightened to speak. Judges and other
participants in the process must be free of fear or of hope of
promotion engendered by those whose actions they are judging.
For some of these, the help of the president is very useful and
may be more readily available if the separation of the prosecutor
from the executive branch is not exaggerated.
For the most difficult type of governmental abuse, violence
by the security forces in the name of internal security, the pic-
ture is complicated. A strong prosecutor enjoying the trust and
respect of the public and the police could provide a substantial
and desired incentive for elected leaders to stop the abuse. But
overcoming the capacity of the security forces to prevent investi-
gations, deny evidence, and influence tribunals requires far more
than independence. What is needed is a process of building trust
and spreading a belief that the prosecutor is crucial to the two
matters that are of central public concern: the control of crime
and the control of governmental abuse.
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